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Ways of Seeing in Renaissance Theatre: Speculating on Invisibility 
 
In a list of goods bought for his company, the Lord Admiral’s Men, Philip Henslowe records 
making a payment for a rather remarkable garment: “a robe for to goo invisibell .”1 However, 
Henslowe himself does not seem particularly impressed by his acquisition. For all its magical 
promise, this robe of invisibility sits innocuously in the middle of a list of other costumes 
purchased since April 3, 1598, including such basics as a “payer of long black wollen stockens.”2 
Furthermore, the invisibility robe was not especially expensive. “Bowght” with “a gown for 
Nembia,” it is jointly priced at £3 and 10S. It is impossible to know how much of this sum was 
spent individually on the robe and how much on the gown, but comparison with other items in 
the inventory provides a sense of the relative cheapness of the double purchase.3 According to 
the same section of the accounts, Henslowe paid over a pound more for a “black satten dublett” 
and a “payer of rownd howsse paned of vellevett,” and about twice as much for “a dublett of 
whitt satten layd thicke with gowld lace, and a payer of rowne pandes hosse of cloth of sylver, 
the panes layd with gowld lace.”4 Invisibility came cheaper than Elizabethan glamour. But while 
the sumptuous garments are fastidiously described (at least in terms of their pricier properties), 
the “robe for to goo invisibell” is, appropriately enough, a blank. This item is identified by its 
function, but its appearance and material features remain obscure. 
 So, how did early modern actors and playwrights represent invisible characters? It is a 
trick that (dis)appears in a range of Renaissance drama. In The Tempest, the spirit Ariel interferes 
with the shipwrecked arrivals on Prospero’s island, but is invisible to them; in Doctor Faustus, the 
magician and Mephistopheles steal the Pope’s food and drink while remaining unseen; and a 
stage direction in The Old Wiues Tale demands “Enter Jack invisible,” much as one in The Late 
Lancashire Witches specifies “Enter an inuisible spirit.”5 Clearly, the most mimetic way of making an 
actor invisible would be to keep him offstage, but the action of appearing invisible refuses such 
verisimilitude. It is a rather different proposition from moments when dialogue refers to figures 
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that are not seen by onstage characters and the watching audience, or when figures are visible to 
other onstage characters but are invisible to the audience.6 By contrast, staged invisibility is not a 
(comparatively) simple matter of disappearing or removing oneself from view, but rather of 
showing up unseen. This kind of invisibility is performed. Characters are staged as invisible 
across different genres, in comedies, tragedies, and mythical plays produced in professional 
playhouses in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 7 Etymologically, “theatre” means “to see 
or behold,” and so to make the invisible theatrical is to perform a paradox. 8 It is to create a 
tension in the act of viewing whereby what is seen is not what is meant. But it is this very 
awkwardness that makes staged invisibility revealing for an understanding of how vision worked 
in Renaissance playhouses. Staged invisibility intensifies the interpretive work that underpins all 
theatrical viewing, where spectators see actors but can read characters, or view synecdochic 
props (e.g. ropes) but recognize a fictional location (a ship at sea). Understanding the dynamics 
of staged invisibility provides an insight into how audiences engaged with the visual content of 
plays and clarifies the mechanics of theatrical seeing. This exploratory essay investigates not only 
how invisible characters were staged in Renaissance theatre, but also what it means to represent 
invisibility, and what the viewing of invisibility might tell us about how theatricality works.  An 
easily understood theatrical signifier, the invisible-character-visible-actor nevertheless exposes the 
complexity of representation. The visual contradiction central to staged invisibility poses 
questions about the materiality of performance, as well as about the various practical, subjective 
and ideological forces that influence how spectators interpret what they see. The scope of this 
essay is accordingly broad. 
 Renaissance spectators viewed the stage in an era of visual uncertainty. Not only was 
professional theatre a relatively new medium in which dramatists necessarily experimented with 
their viewers’ interpretive skills, but vision itself was exposed as unreliable in various cultural 
discourses. On the one hand, sight retained its traditional status as the “noblest of all the 
senses.”9 After all, this faculty was considered to have a greater spiritual function than the other 
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more material senses.10 Richard Brathwaite explained that the bodily eye had a special connection 
with the soul’s eye: “Passions of the minde receiue their greatest impression by the eye of the 
bodie; and soonest are they allayed when the eye is most temperate.”11 But this same pre-
eminence of the eye made sight spiritually dangerous too: “there is no passage more easie for the 
entry of vice than by the cranie of the eye.”12  
These long-standing spiritual qualms were intensified by changing optical understanding. 
Stuart Clark has shown how the European “inherited confidence” in sight’s reliability was 
undermined during the early modern period.13 Aristotelian theories of perception conceived of 
visual experience as generally accurate. In the thirteenth century, scholars such as Roger Bacon 
and Thomas Aquinas adapted the doctrine of species and “creatively mapped [it] onto 
interpretations of Aristotle.”14 While the precise behavior of species was debated, one widely 
accepted understanding of the visual process conceived of it as dependably representational: 
objects emitted sensible forms (species) which carried their likenesses to the eye, like a stamp 
making an impression in wax. However, “the 250 years between the early fifteenth and the late 
seventeenth centuries” saw the “collapse of the ‘representational’ model of vision based on 
species” since “visual anomalies and paradoxes multiplied to such a degree that they overwhelmed 
the cognitive theory that permitted them to occur.”15 As understanding of the eye deepened, so 
too did awareness of how easily it might be deceived. Artistic advances with perspectival and 
anamorphic techniques testified to the eye’s vulnerability to manipulation. At the  same time, the 
forces of reformation and counter-reformation brought debates about idolatry to the fore, giving 
a renewed emphasis to fears that an admiring gaze might all too easily slip into blasphemy. 
Optical findings were enlisted in moral tracts warning against the spiritual peril of vision. Thus 
George Hakewill admonished:  
  Neither doe our eies onely serue as panders, and brokers, or rather   
  traiterous porters, for the inletting of these enemies vpon the soule, 
  but also as false reporters in naturall, & artificiall things […Who  
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has not seen that thrown] in the water a little peece of silver, seemes  
to be double in qua[n]tity? and straight things crooked? that from the  
topps of high mountaines, heardes of cattell seeme to be but Ants?16 
Knowledge about how vision worked was changing at a time when the spiritual stakes of seeing 
were especially fraught.17 Looking at the staging of invisible characters helps to clarify some of 
the ways in which theatrical and ideological perspectives interacted. 
 
The Cultures of Invisibility 
The appeal of staging invisible characters partly draws on a broader cultural fascination with the 
concept of invisibility. Stories about invisibility in early myth work to expose the darker impulses 
of human nature.18 In Book II of Plato’s Republic Glaucon questions whether the human 
commitment to justice is genuine, and illustrates his point with the story of the Ring of Gyges . 
The shepherd Gyges happens upon a ring that turns him invisible; he uses his newfound power 
to seduce the queen, kill the king, and usurp the kingdom. Glaucon concludes that giving such a 
ring to either a just man or an unjust man would produce the same outcome: both men would 
steal, indulge in their lust and kill as they pleased. Ethical behavior depends upon holding people 
accountable for what they do; more specifically, people and the actions they take need to be seen.  
Early modern writers likewise understood invisibility as the ultimate (if hypothetical) 
moral test. Barnabe Barnes lauded honesty as one of the four cardinal virtues of good princes. 
Taking a more optimistic stance than Glaucon, he claimed this value would not dissolve when 
removed from sight: “For if [the honest prince] were possessed with that ring which Plato 
mentioneth, by which Gyges going invisible became king of Lydia, hauing power to do what he 
list: yet wold his wisdom & honestie restraine him from all violence.”19 The same moral idea has 
a negative spin in sectarian tracts that accuse Catholics of various hidden villainies. Thus John 
Jewel rails against Catholic authorities for withholding scriptures from the people, asking drily: 
“Doe they suppose that theyr sleyghts be not yet espied? or that they can nowe, as thoe they had 
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Gyges ring, walke inuisible?”20 Lodowick Lloyd describes the foiled Babington plotters as having 
sought “to walke vnseene, with Giges ring” and Henry Burton warns that, while Jesuit priests 
have been banished from England, “they learne thereby, to walke the more invisible, hoping by 
Gyges his Ring, to obtaine their desire.”21 Invisibility represents a fantasy of freedom from social 
structures and the ability to act without consequence. In post-Reformation propaganda, 
invisibility metaphors symbolized fears of “papists” operating without regard for Protestant 
authorities. Stories about invisibility in less theologically charged literature provide a 
paradoxically voyeuristic pleasure: they show what people would do if they were not being 
watched.  
Narrative accounts of invisibility usually read like thought-experiments in Renaissance 
literary and discursive texts. Invisibility is an obviously fictional device, rather than a real-life 
possibility. Defending the value of poetry and of the literary imagination itself, Philip Sidney 
points out that even Plato made his philosophy accessible by “interlacing mere tales, as Gyges 
ring and others, which who knoweth not to be flowers of poetry did neuer walk in Apollo’s 
garden.”22 The definitively fictional quality of this story also lies behind John Marston’s satirical 
scorn: “Tell mee browne Ruscus, hast thou Gyges ring, / That thou presum’st as if thou wert 
vnseene!”23 Such passing references presume a shared understanding, at least amongst 
sophisticated readers, that human beings could turn themselves invisible only in the imagination. 
Stories utilizing invisibility plotlines require a literary acceptance of the device, rather than a 
literal belief in its reality. Even so, magic books credulously supply spells that produced charms 
of invisibility, or which summoned up sprits who could work the special effect. 24 Reports of the 
attempted assassination of the Prince of Orange in 1582 highlight both the wickedness 
associated with invisible action and the stupidity of believing it possible . A Spanish merchant 
named Gasper Anastro incited his young clerk to kill the prince, offering the King of Spain’s 
pardon along with substantial riches. These inducements were strengthened, some reports 
alleged, by “a certain Iacobin Frier (called Peter Timmerman)” who made the boy believe “that hee 
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should goe inuisible, hauing giuen him some caracters in paper, and certaine little bones, as of 
frogges, which they found in his pockets, with many coniurations and such like fooleries written 
in his tables.”25 All-too visible, the would-be assassin was captured and executed. The arch-
sceptic Reginald Scot makes the boy’s tragic naivety equivalent to falling victim to a practical 
joke: he pairs the anecdote with that of “a foole, who was made beleeue that he should go 
inuisible, and naked; while he was well whipped by them, u[n]to (as he thought) could not see 
him.”26 Only the criminally gullible could fall for such a ruse.  
Yet invisibility incantations were prevalent enough for Scot to feel the need to debunk 
them in his encyclopedic exposé, The Discouerie of Witchcraft (1584). Scot reproduces details of “the 
waie to go inuisible by these three sisters of fairies,” a program that takes up to three nights and 
eventually produces “the ring of invisibilitie, whereby I may go inuisible at my will and 
pleasure.”27 Unsurprisingly, Scot himself is unconvinced by either the elaborate ceremony or 
claims of invisibility more generally. It is, he insists, against the laws of physics “to bring the 
bodie of a man […] into such a thin airie nature, as that it can neither be seene nor felt, […] it is 
verie impossible: for the aire is inconstant […] this airie creature would soone be carried into 
another region.”28 For Scot, physical palpability is inextricably tied to visibility. He does not 
conceive of invisibility as a solid object becoming transparent, the supposition which usually 
underpins more modern imaginings (think of H. G. Wells’s Invisible Man fearing exposure 
should snow fall on his densely substantial body). Instead, Scot assumes any vanishing from sight 
involves an evaporation of the flesh into a gaseous form – a process that is obviously 
“impossible.” His less scientific observations are still more convincing: “if Asmodaie [the demon 
associated with granting invisibility] can make them go inuisible […] should they not liue in all 
worldlie honor and felicitie?”29 If anyone had managed the feat of turning invisible, they did not 
appear to have much to show for it. 
Even so, while orthodox understanding of the natural world held that humans could not 
really become invisible, Christian theology was predicated on faith in an invisible realm. Paul 
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declared “faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 
11:1) and repeatedly distinguished faith in God from the apprehension that accompanies sight. 
In the Second Letter to the Corinthians he asserts, “we look not at the things which are seen, but 
at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which 
are not seen are eternal” (2 Corinthians 4:18), later clarifying “For we walk by faith, not by sight” 
(2 Corinthians 5:7). This extra-visual quality of faith was given renewed emphasis during the 
ongoing Reformation, when visible and invisible categories within religious belief were 
reorganized. Roman Catholicism steadfastly declared the Church “a visible companie of people,” 
with a papal structure that must “alwaies bee visible” to “bee the light of the world.”30 However, 
John Calvin’s contrary insistence that outward appearance was no guarantee of real faith, and 
that the true Church was invisible to human eyes, was frequently reiterated by Church of 
England theologians and polemicists in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In 
Synopsis Papismi, the Calvinist clergyman Andrew Willet firmly differentiated the “papist” view 
from the reformed understanding of the “true” Church: “the foundation of the Church, which is 
faith in Christ, is inuisible, therefore the Church is inuisible.”31  
But this emphasis on abstract qualities invisible to human perception was, of course, very 
different from credulity at the notion of mortals making their physical bodies disappear. Indeed, 
the practical impossibility of turning a substance invisible was one of the arguments levelled 
against the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. For example, the Church of Scotland 
minister Robert Bruce objected that Christ’s body could not be really present in the “accidental” 
properties of the Eucharistic bread: “Christs bodie to bee visible and invisible, locall and not 
local, at ane time; it is in euerie respect [a] contradiction: and therefore impossible to be true.” 32 
For Catholic writers such reasoning ignored the miraculous power of Christ’s body.33 Disputing 
Bruce, the priest William Rainolds went still further:  
 if he wil credit Plato he shal fynd, that one Gyges of Lydia in Asia 
 Minor, lived there a long time, as true a man as M[aster] B[ruce] and  
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 yet when he pleased, invisible, by vertue only of a pretious stone […] 
 which whether it be true or no, as I wil not dispute (& yet pretious 
 stones and perfect magicians, and naturalists can do perhaps as great 
 a wonder as this) so hereof may be conceived, that wise and sober men  
 thought not that to be a matter so vnpossible, as now these great 
 sacramentarie Theologes beare vs in hand.34 
Not everyone saw Gyges in the same self-evidently fictional light as Sidney. However, Rainolds’ 
citation of the invisibility ring is part of a particularized polemical spat rather than a standard 
Catholic Eucharistic defense. By contrast, his co-religionist, John Abbot, draws on the 
unlikeliness of human invisibility to mock the Protestants’ invisible Church. His poem, Iesus 
Praefigured, ventriloquizes a divine voice: “Had I made man inuisible to goe, / I would haue 
likewise built my temple soe.”35 
 While there were official confessional disagreements about what was and was not 
invisible in religious practice, the more significant issue is that every form of Christianity believed 
in a divine realm invisible to mortal eyes. In this theological schema, sight was valuable only at 
one remove. The ophthalmologist Richard Banister celebrated his professional enthusiasm for 
vision in religious terms: “Sight hath a sence of blessednesse, in seeing the Workes of God.” 
More importantly, what was seen gave epistemological access to what was unseen: “Inuisible 
things may be knowne by visible.”36 Living human beings saw only a small portion of the 
Christian universe; the essential part was invisible. Even so, Reginald Scot insisted that the two 
realms were phenomenologically distinct, so that while human bodies are “visible, sensitiue, and 
passiue,” any scriptural example of “a spirit or diuell is to be understood spirituallie, and is 
neither a corporall nor a visible thing.”37 Just as a human being could not turn invisible, neither 
could a spirit take on a fleshy form. By Scot’s logic, readers needed no supernatural fear of what 
they could see, because anything visible was mortal; likewise, they needed no supernatural fear of 
what they could not see, since spirits were substantively separate from earthly reality . However, 
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Christian belief in the numinous made it difficult to keep this careful taxonomy. The devil 
proved especially challenging because of his deceitful ability to confound categories of the visible 
and the invisible. Cautioning against believing what you see, George Hakewill contended that: 
 for the divels subtiltie in deceiving the sight, tis a matter agreed on 
 all hands that hee hath the power (Vertumnus or Proteus like) to turne  
himself into any shape, or (Chameleon like) into any colour: nay which  
is more, wheras the Chameleon cannot change himselfe into white; yet 
can the Divell transforme himselfe into an Angell of light: and not only 
himselfe, but other things in such sorte, that sometimes hee makes 
them seeme to bee present when they are not, and sometimes not  
to seeme when they are, and at other times againe, to appeare in another 
shape and fashion than they are indeed, & in their owne nature [my emphasis].38 
In attempting to pinpoint the devil’s rampantly slippery deceit, Hakewill’s list conflates different 
tricks. Not only can the devil disguise a physical substance, but he can also disappear it . Thus 
Hakewill’s text indicates that not all Protestant writers maintained the same straightforward 
separation of the physically visible and the spiritually invisible insisted upon by witchcraft 
sceptics such as Scot, or sacramental theologians such as Bruce. For Hakewill, breaches in the 
visual order were possible but devilish; invisibility could only be achieved through demonic 
means. He raises the story of “Gyges his going invisible, by vertue of turning his ring”: “if it were 
true, I certainely beleeue it to haue been, the working of the divell, not of the ring .”39 Hakewill 
might be reluctant to credit this story of invisibility, but in detecting possible devilry, he is 
nevertheless unable to discredit it entirely. In fact, he is rather more credulous than storytellers 
like Sidney and Marston. Given the immorality conventionally associated with invisibility, it is 
not surprising that Hakewill should attribute invisible action to the devil. But his cautious 
acceptance that a story of invisibility might be “true” also reveals the way religious faith opens up 
numinous possibilities in vision, not always tidily arranged by confessional doctrine . While the 
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notion that human beings could turn invisible was widely accepted as the stuff of stories, those 
stories took some of their power from a lingering sense that the boundaries between the visible 
and the invisible were sometimes porous.  
 
A Special Effect? 
Early modern drama works through varied cultural attitudes to invisibility. In The Puritaine (c. 
1606), Thomas Middleton stages a jest about failed invisibility that works similarly to Reginald 
Scot’s barb about the naked fool. The play features a scholar called Pieboard who pretends to be 
a conjurer – a con that is, naturally, more remunerative than academic work – and an 
impoverished Captain who feigns an ability to tell fortunes. For a “litle sport,” they convince the 
foolish Edmond that the Captain has turned him invisible. The trick is performed easily: “why, 
looke you sir tis no more but this and thus and agen and now yar inuisible!”40 Inevitably, 
Edmond’s immediate instinct is to behave badly: he pinches Pieboard on the nose and then slaps 
his uncle in the face – proving Plato’s point about the civilizing necessity of visibility.41 But the 
moment also reveals how staged invisibility might have worked. The “this-ing,” “thus-ing” and 
“agen” of the fake conjurer’s charm give an actor plenty of scope for comic action as he 
persuades Edmond that he is becoming invisible. Primarily, though, the humor of the situation 
derives from the fact that nothing real is happening and that Edmond is idiotic  for believing that 
it is; he is demonstrably visible. And yet would the Captain’s trick have been substantially 
different from other theatrical acts of “going invisible”?  
Modern camera tricks and computer generated imagery (CGI) condition viewers to 
expect “realistic” representations of invisibility in film and television. In the 2001 film Harry 
Potter put on a shimmery invisibility cloak that made his body transparent and his head appear 
to float in the air; even in 1940, in The Invisible Man Returns, the eponymous protagonist took on a 
foggy insubstantiality. However, familiarity with such special effects blinds us to how easy it is, 
without technology, to trick the eye into not seeing something that is present if a “real” sense of 
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invisibility is the goal. It is a point made unnervingly clear in a Transport for London (TfL) road 
safety advertisement of 2008.42 Featuring two basketball teams – one clad in black, the other in 
white – playing with two balls, the minute-long film asks viewers to count the number of passes 
made by the team in white. Any satisfaction gleaned from accurately counting thirteen passes in 
the complex choreography is undermined by the question: “but did you see the moonwalking 
bear?” Sure enough, play the clip again, and a man in a bear suit appears, slinking around the 
players, but oddly invisible to a viewer looking out for something else. The only “special effect” 
used here is to direct the eye to focus on a different action. Psychologists call this phenomenon 
“inattentional blindness,” deriving from the “disparity between the richness of our experience 
and the details of our representation” and our lack of “conscious perception without 
attention.”43 Such research indicates how little we “look” when we see things; we focus on what 
we think matters and our brains guess everything else.  
While there was no early modern theory of “inattentional blindness,” conjurers 
demonstrated awareness of how visual distraction and aural misinformation can prevent people 
from seeing what is in front of their eyes. Samuel Rid counselled would-be “iuglers” to use 
“strange words […] to leade away the eie from espying the manner of your conuayance.”44 And 
the anonymous Hocus Pocus Iunior explained the distracting gestures needed “to make a stone seeme 
to vanish out of your hand”: 
 Open your hand then tossing it up, and blow a blast, and look up, 
 saying, Do you see it is gone. Your looking up will make them to 
 looke up, in which time you may take the stone againe in the other 
 hande, and slip it into your pocket.45 
As Evelyn Tribble has suggested, if theatrical companies wanted audiences to share the 
characters’ amazement at the supernatural vanishing of Macbeth’s witches or the Ghost of 
Hamlet’s father, they could easily create a diversion in a different part of the stage and 
consolidate the effect with manipulatively astounded dialogue. 46 Furthermore, Philip Butterworth 
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argues that medieval and Renaissance theatre made use of similar technology to contemporary 
conjurers to produce special effects. Stage directions in The Wasp (1630) indicate use of a rotating 
table: the banquet on “A Table ffurnisht” is replaced by “snakes toads & newtes” when “the 
table turns & such things apear.”47 Butterworth speculates that a similar prop may have been the 
“quaint device” by which Ariel (appearing as a harpy) conjures away a banquet in The Tempest; the 
clap of the harpy’s wings providing distraction from the mechanical business (3.3.52.3) . Similarly, 
Barbara Palmer contends that, even before professional playhouses arrived, medieval theatre had 
plenty of technology to vanish something from view: “Winches pulleys, traps, heavens, wires, 
other hoisting devices, and concealing devices, particularly clouds: documentation of their 
fabrication and use in performance is plentiful, particularly in Continental records.”48 Should 
early modern actors wish their characters to vanish, they had various techniques and devices to 
enable them to do so. 
Given the availability of such techniques, it is perhaps surprising that so many 
Renaissance plays also demand something importantly different from an act of vanishing: the 
staging of an invisible character. A vanishing figure is a figure who, one way or another, exits the 
stage; an invisible character remains on the stage. To say that someone is invisible is to make a 
statement about presence: you might not be able to see him or her, but the point is that s/he is 
still there. And scrutiny of the plays in which invisible characters appear reveals that it is not 
necessary, or even desirable, for invisible characters to be actually invisible to the audience . 
Instead, the basic requirement is that viewers interpret what they see as “invisibility.” Indeed, as 
Alan C. Dessen notes, even stage vanishings were not necessarily “verisimilar” actions that 
involved an actor actually disappearing suddenly from view. The same meaning could be 
communicated imaginatively: viewers could see an actor while understanding that the character 
had disappeared from the scene, and that his visible departure from the stage was to be 
interpreted as an abrupt vanishing in the fictional world.49 Briefly associating this effect with the 
staging possibilities of invisible characters, Dessen argues that imaginative viewing makes the 
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spectator “a more active participant.”50 If vanishing characters might sometimes enlist more 
“active” spectatorship, invisible characters required it. In focusing on the widespread but 
specialized phenomenon of the invisible character, this essay pursues the consequences of such 
active participation.51 What does it mean for a spectator to see one thing but to read it as 
something else? 52 How might viewers see and un-see at the same time? Why is this somewhat 
odd demand to “Enter invisible” an apparently easy convention? 
Part of the pleasure of invisible characters in Renaissance theatre is derived from seeing 
something happen. In George Peele’s The Old Wiues Tale (1595), a stage direction reads: “Enter 
Iack inuisible, and taketh off Sacrapants wreath from his head, and his sword out of his hand .”53 At this 
moment, the evil sorcerer Sacrapant loses his power. For the scene to make sense to the 
audience they need to see an action; they need to see the invisible. Sacrapant is confused about 
what is happening: “What hand inuades the head of Sacrapant?” ([E4v]). His disorientation gives 
the audience an indication of their omniscience (though not all staged invisibility shares this 
connotation). But if the invisible Jack were not visible to the audience, nothing dramatic would 
have happened. Staging the invisible involves making the audience understand that what they see 
is not visible, while also making sure that they see that invisible action. Invisible characters have 
to be seen to be unseen. 
The activities of such characters provide clues as to what Henslowe’s intriguing “robe for 
to goo invisibell” might have looked like. This costume, whatever its appearance, was a visible 
sign of the invisible. Dessen and Thomson report that theatrical “robes” tended to be 
ceremonial or associated with the supernatural.54 The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that robes 
were often “long loose outer garment[s]” and sometimes “denote[d] a person’s rank, office, 
profession.”55 Following consultation with the textile historians Maria Hayward and Santina 
Levey, Barbara Palmer lists five materials possibly used in Henslowe’s robe: cloth of silver or 
cloth of gold (shimmery, but relatively stiff); tinseled satins (advantageously light weight); black 
velvet or the lighter-weight black satin; a shot fabric (offering changeable effects); or a light-
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weight linen or silk decorated with painting or staining.56 Palmer herself ventures that the 
garment would most likely have been black, and take the form of a learned man’s robe, “the 
intent being to blend in rather than stand out.”57 However, this conclusion is problematic. 
Henslowe’s description of this robe as being for the purpose of going invisible suggests that it 
must have looked different from other costumes in stock. If a learned man’s robes would do, 
why buy a special item for invisibility? Moreover, study of invisible characters themselves reveals 
that they do not blend into the background. While other characters do not see them, invisible 
characters are often the focus of the audience’s attention: viewers are directed to look at them , as 
when a devil “commeth and changeth the Popes bottles” despite the “spetiall care” of the bottle-man 
(The Devil’s Charter); or a spirit claws at a character to inflame her lust, or bites others to send 
them mad (The Two Noble Ladies); or when a fairy king drugs a sleeping fairy queen regardless of 
the presence of her watchful retinue (A Midsummer Night’s Dream).58 The flexible, shimmery 
tinseled fabric or stained textiles that Palmer dismisses as too showy are workable possibilities.  
While Henslowe must have bought the robe to be used, it is revealing that no extant play 
refers to it: theatrical invisibility does not require a purpose-bought costume. In fact, no 
particularly “special” effect is necessary. It may be difficult to turn invisible in real life, but on the 
stage it is extremely easy, as is evident in the 1604 quarto of Doctor Faustus (A-Text). Faustus 
instructs Mephistopheles: “charme me that I may be inuisible, to do what I please vnseene of any 
whilst I stay in Rome.” The devil readily complies: “So Faustus, now do what thou wilt, thou 
shalt not be discerned.”59 In the 1616 quarto (B-Text) Mephistopheles puts considerably more 
effort into the same trick. Waving a “Magicke wand” and enlisting “The Planets seuen” as well as 
“Hell and the Furies,” the B-Text devil enacts a ten-line ritual in which Faustus must kneel and 
put on a “girdle.”60 However, the A-Text’s single line works just as well. Stage business may have 
reinforced the words, but any signal to let the audience know that they are supposed to interpret 
the character as invisible is enough. As with any instance of staged invisibility, this could be as 
little as other characters reacting as if they cannot see the person in question. In fact, it is exactly 
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the same process as in The Puritaine when Edmond was fooled into thinking he was invisible. On 
the Renaissance stage, successful and failed invisibility look the same. Audiences accept the 
visible Faustus as invisible, but understand that the similarly charmed Edmond is not. These 
theatrically invisible characters do not actually disappear; judged by the standards of 
verisimilitude, it is a particularly poor effect. Yet the visual weakness of this trick is precisely 
what gives it such a powerful theatrical impact.  
 
Theatrical Seeing 
The contradictory dynamics of visualizing invisibility are especially acute in The Two Merry 
Milkmaids (1620). This Red Bull comedy plays with the paradox of inviting spectators to see and 
not see, in an effect that is visibly weak but theatrically convincing. Featuring a scholarly 
magician, it draws on Doctor Faustus, but cautiously contains the dangers unleashed by Marlowe’s 
occult tragedy. Somewhat coyly, the comedy plays with the notion of magic as both a theatrical 
trick and a real force. In the first scene, the young student Bernard, like Faustus before him, sits 
in a study and believes he has summoned a demon. It soon transpires that this “demon” is 
merely his disguised tutor Landoff. Yet having shown how easy it is to feign supernatural 
activity, the play then invites the audience to believe in it, when Landoff himself “really” 
summons spirits and does magic. These different levels of supernatural performance – in which 
magic is both a ruse and a “reality” – give the plot some credibility. The play acknowledges that 
it is possible to fake magical action, but insists that such illusions do not invalidate real 
supernatural power. At the same time, in counterpointing gauche Bernard with wise Landoff, the 
play safeguards supernatural risks. Landoff responsibly keeps his magical knowledge occult, not 
sharing his dangerous skills with anyone else. The representational splintering produced by 
staged invisibility is entirely appropriate to a play that takes an ambivalent position on magic . Just 
as the supernatural is staged as both an illusion and a reality, so too are its invisible characters 
representationally true and false. 
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 Both the printer’s preface and the prologue stress that the play’s pleasures are primarily 
visual. The printer explains that “It was made more for the Eye, then the Eare” and the Prologue 
warns the audience not to “expect” the Red Bull’s usual battery of sound effects: there will be 
“no noyse of Guns, Trumpets, nor Drum, / Nor Sword and Target.” And even the spectacles 
lack explosive “Squibs and Crackers.”61 Instead, invisibility is trailed early in the play as a 
desirable power and theatrical treat: Bernard is excited at the prospect of a demon that “maketh a 
man inuisible” (B2r). The brilliantly convoluted plot contrives, by means of a ring of invisibility, to 
satisfy these expectations and turns multiple characters invisible at different moments in the 
story. 
 The comedy stretches to breaking point a joke about the fundamental contradiction in 
the staging of invisible characters: the fact that they are entirely visible. In the play’s first invisible 
transformation, groping confusion produces broad physical comedy: 
Landoff: Put on this Ring, 
Now tell me Bernard where is Dorilus? 
Bernard: Into aire vanished, or suncke into the earth, 
For I protest I see no Dorilus. 
Landoff: Call to him, try if he heare thee. 
Bernard: Dorilus, Dorilus. 
Dorilus: Why here man, I am here. 
Bernard: Here; where? 
Dorilus: Why here, close by thee, now I touch thee. 
Bernard: This is thy hand? 
Dorilus: Yes. 
Bernard: It may be foote for any thing that I know, but that 
Now I feele the fingers (I2r-v). 
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From the audience’s perspective, a very visible Dorilus waves and prods at an “unseeing” 
Bernard, while Bernard grabs “any thing” in Dorilus’s body (an invitation for bawdy grasping?). 
The humor depends upon viewers seeing in two ways at once: audiences must accept that 
Bernard cannot see Dorilus, but at the same time, the disjunction between this imaginative truth 
and the unavoidable reality of Dorilus’s visual presence is what makes the moment funny.62 The 
lack of special effect makes the drama more effective. 63 
 Invisibility creates especially self-conscious theatrical moments.64 While Dorilus’s 
disappearing act might be rather silly, it nevertheless reveals something fundamental about the 
powers and possibilities of theatrical spectatorship itself. Invisible characters always introduce 
different levels of representation into the drama. Sometimes plays invite viewers simply to accept 
the visual signifier of invisibility: in The Old Wives Tale when Jack enters “inuisible” and takes 
Sacrapant’s crown spectators only need to buy into the notion that Sacrapant cannot see an 
action that is nevertheless taking place. But at the other extreme, some drama revels in theatre’s 
inability to make a character actually invisible. In the case of The Puritaine, where Edmond is 
conned into believing he is unseen, the fiction is entirely dissolved: the way that theatre visually 
stages invisibility is openly mocked as the kind of thing that would gull a fool . Yet all instances of 
staged invisibility – that is, moments when drama shows us a supposedly invisible character – 
create a tension between the power of our imaginative acceptance of the convention and the 
feebleness of the representation. Such moments are among the least mimetic parts of a theatrical 
performance, and yet also emphasize how elastic representational tricks can be. When we see an 
invisible character we necessarily suspend our disbelief, but at the same time, we are also meta -
theatrically aware that s/he is merely a representation. Different plays may place different 
emphasis on one or other part of that equation, but both are necessary.65 The invisible character 
reveals the central crux of theatricality, showing viewers the fiction and the reality at the same 
time. Curiously, the pleasure produced by such spectacle is that of recognizing how theatre 
works and how close it is to collapse. 
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 In this respect, invisible characters reveal that theatrical spectatorship could function 
quite differently from the process outlined by Renaissance anti-theatricalists, who assumed that 
viewers lost their rational faculties in the face of stage spectacle. Stephen Gosson admonished: 
  Shall wee that vaunte of the law, of the Prophets, of the Gospel,  
  so looke, so gaze, so gape upon plaies, that as men that stare on the  
  head of Maedusa and are turned into stones, wee freeze unto 
  ease in our own follies?66 
As Jennifer Waldron comments, “Gosson’s verbs for the act of seeing degenerate from an 
innocent ‘look’ to an indulgent ‘gaze,’ culminating finally in an idiotic ‘gape.’”67 Similarly, 
Marguerite A. Tassi notes, “Gosson conveys a sense of the destructive passivity in the theatrical 
viewing that results in sensual ease and the paralysis of reason.”68 This fear that viewing could 
lose all its cognitive discernment when theatrical illusions were presented before the eyes is 
central to anti-theatrical arguments. However, the example of staged invisibility makes it clear 
that theatrical spectatorship was an active process, requiring an imaginative interpretation of 
things seen. A mindlessly gawping spectator would see only a visible actor, not an invisible 
character. Visualizing invisibility requires an act of looking in which the viewer’s credulity and 
disbelief are both enlisted, and, oddly, strengthen one another.  
Yet this same tension drives any theatrical viewing, just not so explicitly. Even wonder at 
how “real” a theatrical performance seems takes its force from awareness that it is not . Anthony 
Dawson identifies the particular Renaissance features of this dynamic in era’s the “wide open” 
playhouses. The endless extra-fictional distractions (such as misbehaving audience members) 
create a “heterogeneity of looking” that actors and playwrights managed by acknowledging. Thus 
by having Lear desperately call attention to the “dead” Cordelia’s lips in the hopes of finding 
breath, spectators are asked to see a corpse in the breathing actor, and fix on the very tension 
that could break the illusion. According to Dawson, Shakespeare here stimulates “some kind of 
meta-theatrical consciousness which at the same time leads paradoxically to engagement.”69 We 
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might note that the meta-theatrical “distraction” Dawson describes, much like the all too visible 
“invisible” character, exposes the weakness of theatrical illusion. Theatrical viewing swivels 
continuously between acceptance and disbelief, a sense of an effect’s sophistication and its flaws . 
Theatricality constantly teeters on the brink of failure, and the pleasure of theatrical spectatorship 
involves seeing that risk negotiated.70 All theatrical performance is constituted by the act of being 
seen; it is contingent upon the viewer’s interpretation – an interpretation that understands a 
relationship between signs and meanings that is (to varying degrees) different from that practiced 
in “real” life. As the Chorus in Henry V emphasizes, theatre is not simply produced by the 
actions of performers, but through the (usually unspoken) contract by which viewers agree to 
exert an interpretive effort to read those actions in a certain way. Audiences know to recognize a 
semiotic distinction between onstage and offstage; they know that a character speaking “aside” is 
heard by them but not by other characters; they know that a character walking onstage from the 
tiring house doors cannot necessarily see or hear (or be seen or heard by) characters exiting the 
stage.71 They know all this in the same way that they know a visible actor can be an invisible 
character. Drawing attention to the need to make this interpretive effort can ease that same 
strain. Making spectators aware of the work they are putting in keeps them interpretively alert.  
 
The Seeing Subject 
In revealing the active interpretation required in theatrical viewing, staged invisibility tells us 
something about how the processes of seeing and being seen constitutes subjects. John Berger 
affirms, “We never look at just one thing; we are always looking at the relation between things 
and ourselves.”72 What the eye sees – and the way the eye sees – helps constitute the “I”; but 
then, the nature of that “I” also determines what and how the eye sees. Furthermore, seeing is 
partly cultural: what we pay attention to and the way we interpret it is socially conditioned.73 
Theatre, theatrum – a place for viewing – frames a mode of spectatorship where interpretation is 
slightly different from in real life. Shared agreement about the theatrical meaning of signs is 
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needed for plays to function. Working at the birth of professional theatre, Renaissance 
dramatists endlessly tested, stretched and bent the representational rules that underpinned 
theatrical viewing and the process by which audiences understood what they saw. The prevalence 
of incidents of failed theatrical spectatorship in Renaissance plays testifies to a heightened 
awareness of the complex viewing demands in this relatively novel professional medium. Drama 
features onstage audiences who cannot distinguish player and part (“You lie, you are not he”) 
and fictional actors who explain away their performance (“I Piramus am not Piramus, but Bottome 
the Weauer”).74 Such comic catastrophe might reveal an anxiety about spectators’ ability to 
understand representation. But as Kendall L. Walton has convincingly argued the basic premise 
of theatre is no more difficult to grasp than a child’s game of “make-believe.”75 And given that 
these scenes of theatrical mishap are often entangled in meta-theatrical frames that rely on an 
audience’s interpretive proficiency, it seems more likely that these moments are, ironically, 
celebratory. There is an incredulous joy at how theatrical representation is easy to grasp but 
becomes oddly complex when explained. Somehow playwrights can count on spectators putting 
in the interpretive work necessary to transform an actor into a character, a signifier into a broadly 
agreed signification.  
In this last section of the essay I would like to suggest that this representational 
mechanism can also embed cultural attitudes into the fictional framework. Because it so 
obviously requires both active and shared interpretation, staged invisibility is a particularly useful 
phenomenon for analyzing the ways of looking demanded by plays and their ideological 
structures. The construction of subject positions becomes clear in scenes that revolve around an 
interplay between the visible and the invisible. 
 A number of Renaissance plays use invisible characters to draw ideological distinctions 
between different people. Massinger’s and Dekker’s The Virgin Martyr (1622) stages “invisible” 
spectacle to distinguish between pagan “blindness” and Christian perspicuity. Dorothea, the 
titular virgin, is given visual support during her martyrdom by an angel who is invisible to her 
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pagan tormenters. Her miraculous endurance is framed in visionary terms that exclude the 
executioners. As she focuses on “Angelo in the Angels habit,” Antoninus exclaims “what obiect / 
Is her eye fixed on?” Macrinus can only reply “I see nothing.”76 The special vision that enables 
Dorothea to see the invisible character identifies her saintly subjectivity; since audience  members 
also see the ostentatiously costumed Angelo, the dramaturgy validates this perspective and 
shapes a Christian vision. The play’s conclusion replays this dynamic, as the converted 
Theophilus likewise suffers martyrdom, and remains “confirm’d” in his new belief by a “Most 
glorious vision” that is seen only by him and the audience: “Enter Dorothea in a white robe, crownes 
vpon her robe, a Crowne vpon her head, lead in by the Angell, Antoninus, Caliste and Christeta following all in 
white, but lesse glorious, the Angell with a Crowne for him” (Mr). Playhouse spectators necessarily see 
things from a miraculously Christian point of view; this perspective is all the more insistent 
because pagan characters are blind to what is emphatically visible. 77 
 Herod and Antipater (1622), uses vision to reveal its protagonists’ moral dimensions. The 
dying Pheroas sees his “Fear and a guilty Conscience” in a vision that is visible to no one else, 
not even the audience.78 His description of seeing himself as Marriam’s false accuser creates an 
image that is part memory, part allegory, part psychological projection and part supernatural 
visitation. Since the vision is not staged and remains fully invisible to all but Pheroas, it fosters a 
sense of his interiority, which remains removed from the audience. But similar visions are 
“invisibly” staged later in the play. On his deathbed, a remorseful Herod is visited by the ghosts 
of his victims; their invisible status is emphasized by the presence of Augustus who maintains 
“here appeares / Nothing that’s strange about vs” (Lr). To complicate matters further, Antipater 
shares the scene, in a different part of the stage and a different fictional space. He too is visited 
by the offended ghosts. The same scene thus presents various figures as differently “unseen.” 
Herod and Antipater do not see one another because representational convention puts an 
invisible screen between their separate locations; no one but Herod and Antipater see the ghosts 
because the play’s moral and supernatural logic renders them invisible. At the same time, the 
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invisible ghosts move freely between the different fictional spaces occupied by Herod and 
Antipater, in a way that the visible characters, chained to “realistic” representational standards, 
cannot. These surprisingly complex visual demands not only shape Herod and Antipater’s tragic 
subjectivity, but also interpellate the viewers as subjects of the play’s moral schema . The invisible 
ghosts embody the protagonists’ guilt. In Renaissance terms, they are simultaneously 
psychological projections and actual apparitions since the “Conscience” (L2r) Antipater willfully 
ignores is both a facet of his individual interiority and a tool wielded by God. The audience’s 
omnipotence subjects them to a moral vision in which even the hidden hearts of great rulers are 
exposed. By seeing invisible characters, viewers are reminded that no one escapes God’s gaze.  
 However, it is not only God’s vision that shapes subjects: being seen by other people 
helps to constitute an individual’s identity. This much is evident in The Two Merry Milkmaids when 
Frederick, having put on the magic ring, unwittingly turns invisible and loses his sense of status:  
  Am I mad or drunke or the people, both: and blind too I thinke. 
  For let me come vp to them neuer so neere, talke neuer so loud, 
  gripe them neuer so hard, they see mee not stare and gape, as if 
  I were in the aire, and aske, where are you. If wee were out of  
  fauour, I should neuer wonder at it, but being Restord, and in  
  greater grace then euer, it somewhat troubles mee (K3r).79 
The comic trauma of not being visible unsettles Frederick’s ideas about himself, so that he 
cannot be certain if he is “mad or drunke.” Still more significantly, becoming invisible reveals 
Frederick’s social anxiety: he mistakes literal invisibility for the social invisibility of having fallen 
out of courtly favor, as if the two are equivalent. It is the eyes of others that fix subjects’ 
identities and place in society, not the subjects themselves.  
 Yet seeing, at least in human terms, is conceived of as a reciprocal act. This hardwired 
assumption is one reason why young children believe that covering their eyes or hiding under a 
blanket makes them invisible to other people. For many decades, modern psychologists followed 
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Piaget’s theory that this behavior marks children’s egocentrism.80 However, recent research by 
Henrike Moll and Allie Khalulyan finds that children also claim not to be able to see adults with 
covered eyes who sit directly in front of them. Far from being “egocentric,” children consider 
“mutual recognition” to be essential to the act of seeing.81 Perhaps it is a lingering intuition that 
vision normally involves the reciprocity of seeing-and-being-seen that gives invisibility its uneasy 
appeal as something different: becoming invisible interferes with the two-way process. While not 
being seen might obscure a person’s identity, being able to see others while invisible is also 
potentially empowering. Early modern writers who re-told the myth of Gyges’ ring often 
stressed that its power derived not merely from making the wearer invisible, but from the fact 
that the unseen person remained able to see others. Thus Thomas Elyot clarified that when 
Gyges “tourned the broder parte of the ring towarde the palme of his hande, he was seene of no 
man, but he mought see all thinges” and Thomas Morton likewise specified that being invisible 
meant “seeing any, & [being] seene of none” (my emphasis).82 The advantages of breaking free of 
the reciprocal exchange underpinning vision are not lost on Smirke in The Two Merry Milkmaids. 
A Clown but no fool, Smirke declines to hand over the ring of invisibility to the Duke:   
Duke: I do command thee let me see the Ring. 
By which thou walkst inuisible. 
Smirke: I do command thee not to command me that, 
For from my inuisible Ring I will not part […] 
For being inuisible, I am a Prince (O2v-O3r). 
While Frederick lost his sense of self with his visibility, Smirke recognizes that disappearing from 
society’s view frees him from its structures: now he is a “Prince” who might “command” a 
Duke. Indeed, Smirke values invisibility for the same reason Frederick finds it frightening: it 
eliminates the reciprocity of viewing that fixes individuals in a social position. Being able to see 
without being seen affords tremendous power, a point Smirke gives a lightly satirical tone. The 
practical power conferred by invisibility – the ability to do what one likes without the 
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interference of witnesses – is here associated with the political power wielded by a “Prince.” The 
logic of Smirke’s comical self-aggrandizement hints that ethical vision might not be fully 
reciprocal across political hierarchies.  
 
Conclusion 
A representational paradox, the visibly invisible character could too easily be dismissed as a 
theatrical quirk. The demands it places on viewers take the form of a specific contradiction: to 
see and not see at the same time. However, in demonstrating that what is seen (something 
visible) can be readily understood as its opposite (something invisible), these conventional 
moments indicate the full elasticity of theatrical interpretation, which always involves a 
representational transformation. Invisible characters also reveal that one pleasure of theatricality 
lies in the work of theatrical viewing: a (sometimes conscious) process of translating a sign into 
its signification and back again. Furthermore, staged invisibility – with its obvious insistence on a 
shared, constructed vision – can help adumbrate the cultural values that condition a play’s way of 
looking at things.  
By way of conclusion, I want to test out how staged invisibility might consolidate a play’s 
broader vision and provide insights into its meaning. In the brutally spectacular Macbeth, a weird 
collection of supernatural phenomena is made visually available to the protagonist and his 
audience, including witches, a ghost, and a satanic dumb show. But other images remain as what 
Andrew Sofer terms “dark matter,” that is, fully invisible or unseen elements of the play that 
nevertheless structure its action.83 These range from the bedlam of battle, to the “spirits / That 
tend on mortal thoughts,” to the regicide at the heart of the play.84 Marguerite A. Tassi 
compellingly argues that the pervasive quality of these “invisible elements” (literally unseen 
content as distinct from the staged invisibility I have concentrated on in this essay) produces 
“unease, dread, and horror” as they fascinate both Macbeth and the watching audience.85 I would 
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like to widen this observation by considering some of the specific ways of seeing invoked by 
Macbeth in its concern with the unseen and the staging of invisibility. 
Macbeth makes the social and subjective implications of visibility central to its tragic 
vision. In particular, its protagonist, who craves invisibility, is literally haunted by a sense of 
being looked at. When Macbeth develops criminal intentions, after learning that the first part of 
the Witches’ prophecy has come true, he longs to be obscured from view:  
  Stars hide your fires, 
  Let not light see my black and deep desires. 
  The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be 
  Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see (1.4.50-53).   
It is not only murderous action that Macbeth wants concealed, but also his intentions, to the 
extent that he wishes to hide even from himself (“The eye wink at the hand”) and urges stars to 
veil themselves. Martin Wiggins points out that Macbeth’s conscience is theatrically unusual: 
earlier staged villains, such as Richard III, are tormented by their bad deeds after the fact, but 
Macbeth struggles with guilt as he merely contemplates murder.86 This sense of conscience is 
visually defined: it is Macbeth’s eye. Macbeth’s guilty dread of looking at his own intentions 
keeps his language imprecise: the “it” he wants “done” is unspecific (and the impersonal 
pronoun remains his preferred method of referring to Duncan’s murder even once the plan is 
forged). Granting “light” the power of sight perhaps also suggests a dread of divine witness, a 
thought too horrible to clarify. In a parallel scene, moments later, Lady Macbeth implores more 
explicitly: 
  Come thick night, 
  And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell, 
  That my keen knife see not the wound it makes, 
  Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark 
  To cry, “Hold, hold.” (1.5.50-54) 
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Once again, the pragmatic desire to keep criminal behavior safely out of sight is coupled with a 
guilty impulse to shut the eye of conscience: the murderous act (here, only a metaphor for some 
plot that has not yet been hatched) is itself blind and heaven is prevented from “peep[ing]” and 
interfering. Macbeth’s refusal to see his criminality is again manifest after the murder of Duncan 
when he finds himself unable to return to deal with the crime scene: “Look on’t again, I dare 
not” (2.2.53). To see is to contemplate the conscience. 
Macbeth’s guilt produces a mental disorder that is registered visually just prior to the 
murder too. Famously hallucinating a dagger, Macbeth wonders if he sees a “false creation / 
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain” (2.1.38-9). In many productions, as was presumably 
the case on Shakespeare’s stage, the dagger remains fully invisible to the audience, so that 
spectators gain a sense of the graphic dimensions of Macbeth’s mind: the invisible dagger 
provides an insight into Macbeth’s subjectivity. But accessible to the spectators only through 
words, the dagger also stresses his separation from “us,” from people who do not see things 
which are not present.87 Regicide isolates Macbeth in a way that brutal violence performed on 
behalf of his king (reported at the start of the play) does not. The “fatal vision” (2.1.36) marks 
Macbeth’s tragic alienation from his society, a point intensified when the audience do not share 
his perspective.  
 The murder of his friend Banquo prompts still more revealing visual interactions. Once 
again, Macbeth wants the murder shrouded into invisibility, urging “seeling night” to “Scarf up 
the tender eye of pitiful day” and use a “bloody and invisible hand” (3.2.47-9). But in the event 
darkness instead thwarts Macbeth’s plans and leaves the murderers in squabbling confusion:  
  3 Murderer: Who did strike out the light? 
  1 Murderer:   Was’t not the way?  
3 Murderer: There’s but one down: the son is fled. (3.3.18-19) 
While Fleance escapes, Macbeth is unable to avoid a sense of being seen. His celebratory 
banquet is gate-crashed by Banquo’s ghost, a vision the stage direction insists is visible to the 
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audience: “Enter the Ghost of Banquo, and sits in Macbeth’s place” (3.4.35).88 It takes another ten lines 
for Macbeth to notice the ghost who is invisible to the other banqueters, so that audience 
members have an omniscient anticipation of the uproar to follow. Macbeth’s terror springs not 
only from seeing a ghost, but from the horrifying way the ghost seems to see him too: “Thou 
canst not say I did it: never shake / Thy gory locks at me” (3.4.47-8). Despite his desperate 
denial, Macbeth is forced to confront a manifestation of his own conscience that insistently 
looks at him. His panicky attempts to shrug off the ghost’s power simultaneously pinpoint what 
makes it so disturbing: “Why, what care I? If thou canst nod, speak too” (3.4.67). This ghost 
does not need to speak; it is being seen by it that torments Macbeth. And the nature of the 
ghost’s vision is uncanny: “Thou hast no speculation in those eyes / Which thou dost glare with” 
(3.4.83-4). In The English Expositor (1616), Richard Bullokar defined “Speculation” as “The inward 
knowledge, or beholding of a thing.”89 Highlighting the aberrant nature of eyes that look without 
perceiving, Macbeth both tries to reject the significance of the ghost’s gaze and also exposes the 
barest form of his fear: the actual look itself. 
The agonistic upheaval of the tragedy is registered in the visual dynamics of the ghost 
scene, which requires the audience to negotiate various different perspectives at once . Viewers 
both understand that Macbeth’s guilt makes him see a ghost, but also recognize that the same 
ghost is invisible to the other characters on stage: Macbeth’s violation of the social order places 
him outside its scope. At the same time, while the banqueting lords cannot see the ghost, they 
also have to pretend not to see their new king’s wild behavior. The only acknowledgement of the 
situation is Ross’s cautious four-word question: “What sights, my lord?” (3.4.114). Under 
Macbeth’s tyrannical rule, subjects might not see what their king sees, but they also have to avoid 
seeing what is evident. Nevertheless, this moment fulfils a real fear for Macbeth: he is unable to 
avoid the accusatory gaze of his victim, and, though he does not realize it, he exposes himself to 
the eyes of his lords. The tragedy seems to insist that it is impossible for human beings to be 
fully concealed, to be invisible: Macbeth is seen. The representational demands of the invisible 
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ghost mean that the audience must negotiate the play’s visual structures, which are conditioned 
by social and spiritual imperatives. Ultimately, the disorder of Macbeth’s violent usurpation and 
“watchful tyranny” (5.9.33) is corrected by the coronation of Malcolm. It is significant that when 
the future king is first persuaded to return home, he is told: “your eye in Scotland / Would create 
soldiers, make our women fight / To doff their dire distresses” (4.3.187-9). At a literal level, the 
point is that Malcolm needs to be seen to inspire a revolt, but the image of the “eye” also 
reinstates a healthier visual economy, in which people see and are seen.  
This necessarily brief glance at the visual dynamics of Macbeth exemplifies some of the 
interpretive possibilities of exploring what the implications of staged invisibility reveal about 
theatrical viewing. Not all Renaissance plays share Macbeth’s visual focus. But my point is not to 
suggest one schematic vision for Renaissance drama, but rather to encourage awareness of how 
the specific ways of seeing invited by individual plays are central to their meaning. The staging of 
invisibility is important because it highlights how theatrical representation requires active visual 
interpretation on the part of spectators, enforcing a shared understanding of signs between 
players and viewers. Furthermore, as Plato made clear, seeing is bound up with ethics, with how 
humans interact with one another, and with the kind of agency individuals have and feel free to 
exercise. In disrupting the normal dynamics of seeing, invisibility helps to illuminate the social 
assumptions underpinning ethical behavior. The phenomenon of staged invisibility not only 
produces theatrical pleasure (the thrill of being in on the device), but also provides key moments 
for seeing how the representational organization of a play enlists the spectators in its ideological 
interests. Exposing the terms of theatrical viewing equips us to scrutinize the perspectives to 
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